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1625 
Moral Mandate or Personal Preference? Possible 
Avenues for Accommodation of Civil Servants 
Morally Opposed to Facilitating Same-Sex Marriage 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As many states begin allowing same-sex marriage, civil servants 
with certain religious beliefs will be forced to either perform 
marriages they morally oppose or resign, effectively “choos[ing] 
between conscience and livelihood.”1 This clash of belief and 
vocation has already occurred for some individuals,2 and it will 
certainly reoccur as same-gender marriage is permitted in a growing 
number of states.3 Despite this conflict, no state has accommodated 
the religious beliefs of the civil servants directly involved in the 
marriage process.4 
Recently, scholars have argued that both empirical evidence5 and 
the very justifications for same-sex marriage6 support the 
accommodation of civil servants with a conscientious objection to 
facilitating same-sex marriages. They argue that, although some 
individuals may see religious beliefs as mere preferences, this attitude 
ignores the role of religion in the history of our nation and in the life 
of the believer and the goal of creating a tolerant and accepting 
society, a goal proponents of same-sex marriage advocate.7 
 
 1. Robin Wilson, Gay Marriage Laws Should Allow for Conscientious Objectors, PRESS 
OF ATLANTIC CITY, May 10, 2009, http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/opinion/ 
commentary/article_22a9dd43-3de8-502b-b09b-b83d93cbce29.html; see also infra Part II. 
 2. See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 3. Many states are still in the process of determining whether they will allow same-sex 
marriage, and some likely will. See, e.g., GLAAD, Rhode Island Working Towards Legal Gay 
Marriage, OPPOSING VIEWS (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.opposingviews.com/i/rhode-island-
working-towards-legal-gay-marriage (stating that a bill that would allow same-sex marriage is 
currently being considered by the Rhode Island legislature). 
 4. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee 
Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318, 320 (2010), available 
at  http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njlsp/v5/n2/6/6Wilson.pdf. 
 5. Id. passim. 
 6. See infra Part II.C. 
 7. See J. David Bleich, The Physician as a Conscientious Objector, 30 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 245, 248 (2002) (arguing that seeing religious beliefs as mere preferences “not only fails 
to respect the role of religion in the life and value system of the religionist, but also fails to 
recognize the historical and pragmatic basis from which the principle of religious freedom 
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This Comment agrees with other scholars who assert that civil 
servants’ beliefs are legitimate, important, and worthy of 
accommodation, and furthers this discussion by reviewing how these 
beliefs may best be accommodated. When considering how to best 
accommodate civil servants with a conscientious objection to same-
sex marriage, it can be helpful to examine how conscience is already 
accommodated in other situations. This Comment examines both 
the primary avenues of accommodation8 and the specific 
accommodations available9 in a variety of contexts.  
This Comment, based on a review of other exemptions, 
concludes that enacting legislation to accommodate civil servants 
while still providing equal service to all members of the public10 
would be both the most effective method of accommodation and the 
method most likely to be enacted by legislatures. The current 
methods of accommodation provide little protection for 
conscientious objectors because legislatures enact them infrequently 
and courts interpret them narrowly.11 
Before reaching these conclusions, Part II of this Comment first 
describes the current state of the law. It does this by 1) providing an 
overview of the limited religious accommodations that currently exist 
for objectors to same-sex marriage and 2) summarizing justifications 
for accommodation of civil servants. Part III then presents the 
history and development of conscientious objection in the United 
States. Part IV provides an overview of the currently available 
avenues of accommodation of religious belief in the United States. 
Part V reviews how various avenues are used to accommodate 
conscientious objectors in a variety of different contexts. Finally, in 
Part VI, this Comment 1) concludes that the best avenue for 
accommodation is ad hoc exemptions and 2) explores how ad hoc 
 
developed”); see also infra Part II.C. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. This method is similar to methods proposed by other scholars. See, e.g., Thomas C. 
Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J. L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 206, 226–32 (2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/ 
njlsp/v5/n2/1/1Berg.pdf. This is also similar to an information-forcing system suggested by 
some scholars. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex 
Marriage from the Health care Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: 
EMERGING CONFLICTS 77, 98 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).  
 11. See infra Part V. 
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exemptions can effectively accommodate civil servants who object to 
facilitating same-sex marriage. 
II. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: THE NEED FOR 
ACCOMMODATION OF CIVIL SERVANTS WHO OBJECT TO SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE 
A. Public Concern About Effects of Same-Sex Marriage on Religious 
Organizations 
In the same-sex marriage debate, there has been a great deal of 
concern over the effect that same-sex marriage would have on 
religious organizations. For example, when Proposition 8, a 
proposed amendment to the California constitution stating that 
“[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized 
in California,”12 was under consideration by the citizens of that state, 
many supporters of the amendment argued that without it, 
individuals’ religious freedom would be taken away.13 
One specific ad quoted San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom’s 
statement that “[same-sex marriage is] gonna happen, whether you 
like it or not.”14 This ad, seen as one of the most effective ads 
supporting the amendment,15 proceeded to list what the proponents 
of the amendment felt could happen if it were not passed, which 
included the claim that “churches could lose their tax exemption.”16 
Other ads endorsing the amendment cautioned that if the 
 
 12. Proposition 8 became law in 2008. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 13. See, e.g., infra notes 17–19. 
 14. VoteYesonProp8, Yes on 8 TV Ad: Whether You Like It Or Not, YOUTUBE (Sept. 29, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4kKn5LNhNto. 
 15. Jonathan Darman, Hoping that Left Is Right, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2009, at 44, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2009/01/16/hoping-that-left-is-right.html. 
Another story noted that: 
Those words would come back to haunt Newsom and the campaign in support of 
same-sex marriage. It became the battle cry of the opponents of same-sex marriage, 
featured in radio and TV advertisements to display not just Newsom’s perceived 
arrogance, but also the fear that supporters of gay and lesbian rights planned to 
trample over the beliefs of the rest of the state. 
Erin Allday, Newsom Was Central to Same-Sex Marriage Saga, SFGATE.COM (Nov. 6, 2008), 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-11-06/news/17128179_1_same-sex-marriage-gays-and-
lesbians-city-hall/5; see also Michael Foust, ‘Historic’ Campaign Scored Prop 8’s Win in 
California, BAPTIST PRESS, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.bpnews.net/BPnews.asp?ID=29277 
(“Those over-the-top words made their way into the first Yes on 8 commercial and helped 
energize Prop 8 supporters.”). 
 16. Foust, supra note 15. 
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amendment was not passed, “churches that rent out their facilities 
for marriages could be forced to allow same-sex marriages on their 
properties,”17 and that churches could even be forced to marry same-
sex couples or lose their tax-exempt status, thereby being “taxed out 
of existence.”18 Concerns about the effect that same-sex marriage 
could have on religious liberty were widespread enough that they 
were specifically addressed both by news reports and by those who 
opposed Proposition 8.19 Ultimately, these concerns seemed to strike 
a chord with many of those who voted for the amendment20 and may 
have made a difference in the passage of Proposition 8, which 
ultimately passed by only a 4.6% margin.21 
States that have allowed same-sex marriage have manifested 
similar concerns about the effect of same-sex marriage on religious 
organizations. A recent review of these accommodations by Robin 
Fretwell Wilson22 found that the states where same-sex marriage is 
allowed “that have embraced meaningful23 religious liberty 
 
 17. PreservingMarriage, YES on Proposition 8 (Prop 8) Your Rights, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-jc4ujp9Ok. This concern was realized when 
“New Jersey’s Ocean Grove Campground, a religious nonprofit, lost its tax-exempt status in 
2007 because the organization refused to rent its facility to a lesbian couple for a civil 
commitment ceremony.” Dean R. Broyles, Gay Rights and the 1st Amendment on a Collision 
Course, LATIMES.COM (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-
broyles-jean27-2008oct27,0,7357456.story. 
 18. Churches May Have Their Tax Exempt Status Challenged or Revoked, WHAT IS 
PROP8?, http://whatisprop8.com/churches-may-have-their-tax-exempt-status-challenged-or-
revoked.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011); see also Should Gay Marriage Be Legal?, 
PROCON.ORG, http://gaymarriage.procon.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (stating that same-
sex marriage conflicts “with the beliefs, sacred texts, and traditions of many religious groups” 
and “[e]xpanding marriage to include same-sex couples may lead to churches being forced to 
marry couples and children being taught in school that same-sex marriage is the same as 
opposite-sex marriage”). 
 19. E.g., Michael Gardner, Law Professors Enter Prop. 8 Fray on Church’s Tax-Exempt 
Status, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 30, 2008, at A3, available at 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20081030/news_1n30exempt.html (stating 
that although some experts insisted that “no religious officiant will be required to solemnize a 
marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs . . . . Some church leaders are not 
convinced” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Scott Bidstrup, Gay Marriage: The Arguments 
and the Motives, BIDSTRUP.COM, http://www.bidstrup.com/marriage.htm (last visited Sept. 
20, 2011) (arguing that churches would not be forced to conduct same-sex marriages). 
 20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 21. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL 
ELECTION 7 (2008), available at  http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/ 
sov_complete.pdf. 
 22. Wilson, supra note 4, at 319–22. 
 23. As Wilson notes, some of these exemptions amount to no more than “hollow 
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protections have exempted religious groups and individuals 
authorized to preside over marriage ceremonies.”24 These 
exemptions insulate “private religious groups that refuse to provide 
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges 
for the solemnization of same-sex marriage” from both lawsuit and 
government penalty.25 
B. Lack of Public Concern for the Effects of Same-Sex Marriage on 
Individuals 
Unfortunately, individual conscientious objectors have not 
received the same attention or protection that religious organizations 
have received. In her review of states’ accommodation of individuals 
with a conscientious objection to same-sex marriage,26 Wilson found 
that “not a single state has shielded the government employee at the 
front line of same-sex marriage.”27 After describing the results of this 
review, Wilson concluded that 
states at the leading edge of same-sex marriage legislation have 
disproportionately insulated large religious institutions and their 
employees from the conflicts ushered in by same-sex marriage, 
while doing relatively little for individual believers. Notably absent 
from these early protections are marriage registrars, clerks working 
in the licensing office, and others who may be asked to facilitate 
same-sex marriages despite their own deeply held religious beliefs.28 
While there has been “some academic prodding”29 and the issue 
has received limited media coverage,30 the issue of accommodation 
 
protection.” Id. at 319 n.7. 
 24. Id. at 319–20 (footnote omitted). 
 25. Id. at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Id. at 319–22. 
 27. Id. at 320. 
 28. Id. at 321. 
 29. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 
5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 275 (2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
journals/njlsp/v5/n2/4/4Lupu.pdf. For examples of this academic prodding, see Wilson, 
supra note 4 passim, and Berg, supra note 10, at 207 (arguing, although not specifically about 
government employees, that “significant religious accommodations for objectors to same-sex 
marriages” should be adopted). 
 30. See, e.g., Chaz Muth, Scholars: Church Won’t Be Forced to Marry Gay Couples If Laws 
Change, AMERICANCATHOLIC.ORG (Mar. 22, 2009), http://www.americancatholic.org/ 
news/report.aspx?id=844 (“Legalizing same-sex marriage . . . could force county clerks to 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, even if such an act goes against their religious 
beliefs . . . .”). 
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for civil servants has not received much public attention. The 
minimal governmental discussion that has taken place has not 
resulted in any actual accommodation for civil servants,31 leaving 
them to “choose between conscience and livelihood.”32 Faced with 
this choice, some governmental employees who were required to 
issue licenses to33 or preside over the marriage of34 same-sex couples 
chose to resign instead.35 
This effectively gives religious belief less weight than a mere 
scheduling conflict—for example, justices of the peace in 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire were told that they could not 
abstain from marrying same-sex couples because of their sexual 
orientation, even though these same justices of the peace could “turn 
down a request to marry any individual couple . . . because the 
[justice of the peace] [wa]s busy, or just [did not] get along with the 
couple.”36 
 
 
 
 
 31. In Massachusetts, justices of the peace were told “that there would be plenty of 
room for conscientious objectors” and “there would be user-friendly [justice of the peace} 
websites where same-sex couples could obtain names of [justices of the peace] who would be 
happy to marry them, and that there would still be room [for justices of the peace who 
objected to personally solemnizing marriages of same-sex couples].” Morning Edition: Mass. 
Justice of the Peace Resigns Over Gay Marriage (NPR radio broadcast May 14, 2004), available 
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1896321. In the end, no 
protections were extended, and justices of the peace were told “to resign if they were unwilling 
to preside over the marriage of same-sex couples.” Jennifer Peter, Justices of the Peace Warned 
Not to Discriminate Against Same Sex Couples, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 25, 2004, available at 
http://www.gaypasg.org/gaypasg/PressClippings/2004/April%202004/justices_of_the_pea
ce_warned_not.htm; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 29, at 275 (“[N]o state has yet been 
willing to grant public officials . . . exemptions from state-created obligations to serve without 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”). 
 32. Wilson, supra note 1. 
 33. Id. (“In Iowa, the state’s attorney general told county recorders that they must issue 
licenses to same-sex couples or face criminal misdemeanor charges and even dismissal.”). 
 34. Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, through his legal counsel, “told the state’s 
justices of the peace . . . to resign if they are unwilling to preside over the marriage of same-sex 
couples.” Peter, supra note 31; accord Morning Edition, supra note 31. 
 35. E.g., Resignation Letter from Linda Gray Kelley, JUST. OF THE PEACE ASS’NS 
NEWSL. (2004), http://jpus.org/newsletter/summer2004doc.htm#resign. 
 36. Lauren Garrison, Some JPs Bristle at Same-Sex Marriage Law, NEW HAVEN REG., 
Nov. 30, 2008, http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2008/11/30/news/a1justiceof 
peace.txt?viewmode=fullstory; see also Morning Edition, supra note 31 (explaining that when 
justices of the peace in Massachusetts are busy, they can turn down individual couples). 
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This lack of public concern for the religious beliefs of individuals 
is likely due to the fact that there are a “relatively small number of 
[individuals] who find themselves morally conflicted.”37 “The 
problems of the few seldom become the concern of the many,”38 and 
when the public at large lacks concern for an issue, representatives 
will likely follow suit. However, the lack of interest in protecting 
these individuals does not make the conflict they face any less 
pressing. With same-sex marriage laws being enacted in an increasing 
number of states, these conflicts between rights, responsibilities, and 
beliefs will likely be faced by a growing number of government 
employees. 
C. Why Civil Servants Should Be Accommodated 
Before engaging in a review of how conscience is and has been 
protected in the United States, this Comment will briefly discuss 
various theories behind why conscientious objectors should or 
should not be protected. The debate centers on religious liberty and 
personal autonomy. 
With the introduction of same-sex marriage in a number of 
states, many religious organizations have been accommodated, but 
no government employee has been afforded the same religious 
objection accommodation.39 The debate surrounding religious 
objection accommodations seems to stem from a difference in 
viewpoint regarding the role of religion in individuals’ lives, with 
those that see religious beliefs as preferences, rather than mandates,40 
calling for much less accommodation for conscientious objectors. 
Ironically, this suggests that many arguments against 
 
 37. Bleich, supra note 7, at 247. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Wilson, supra note 4, at 318–22. 
 40. After stating that one problem with the health care mandate was the small number 
of individuals affected, Bleich states: 
A more serious hurdle lies in the unwillingness of many medical institutions, as well 
as society, to recognize the existence of a genuine moral dilemma. . . . While 
continuing to pay at least lip service to the role of religion in society, society simply 
does not take religion and religious scruples as seriously as it did in days gone by. 
The prevailing notion seems to be that religious preferences are precisely that, 
namely, preferences, but not mandates. Thus, just as recreational, aesthetic, or 
gastronomical preferences must bow to laws of general applicability, it is assumed 
that religious preferences must bow to the demands of the dominant culture that are 
enshrined in statute. 
Bleich, supra note 7, at 247–48. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1632 
accommodation directly mirror arguments against same-sex 
marriage—some on both sides see the other as seeking special 
treatment to indulge a mere personal preference. 
There are a number of other similarities between the arguments 
for same-sex marriage and the arguments for accommodation of 
those who oppose it.41 As one scholar recently noted, 
Recognition of same-sex marriage, whatever technical form legal 
arguments made on its behalf take, exemplifies a “live and let live” 
policy. That same policy should apply equally to religious believers 
who oppose same-sex marriage—they should not be required to act 
directly in opposition to their religious beliefs, that is, in ways that 
appear to confer their personal blessing on such marriages.42 
The previous debate over whether same-sex marriage should be 
allowed is echoed in other ways as well. For example, “the refusal to 
consider religious liberty claims is in part fueled by anger at some of 
the more outrageous statements about gays made by religious leaders 
over the years.”43 However, these reasons are not valid if they force 
civil servants to violate their religious beliefs and do not overcome 
the empirical evidence supporting44 equality-based justifications for 
accommodation of conscience. 
III. HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION, CONSCIENCE, AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. Historical Recognition of Conscience in the United States and 
Abroad 
Freedom of conscience is recognized and addressed to some 
degree both in the United States and internationally.45 Explicit 
 
 41. Thomas C. Berg provides an excellent review of how “[s]everal key arguments that 
have led states to recognize same-sex marriage also call for broad accommodations for religious 
objectors.” Berg, supra note 10, at 212–20 (discussing how both arguments deal with 
“Conduct Fundamental to Identity” and “Conduct Lived Out Publicly in Civil Society”). 
 42. Marc D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 
307, 312–14  (2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njlsp/ 
v5/n2/5/index.html (endorsing accommodation only of private actors and not government 
employees). 
 43. Id. at 310 
 44. See Wilson, supra note 4, passim. 
 45. As one example of the international recognition of conscience, Article 18 of The 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states:  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right 
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protection of conscience in the United States was considered by the 
founding fathers, with Madison’s initial draft of the First 
Amendment stating: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on 
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion 
be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in 
any manner, or on any pretence, infringed.”46 
B. Development of Conscientious Objection in the United States 
Although the First Amendment does not explicitly mandate 
freedom of conscience, the freedom could arguably be read into its 
text. Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court declined to infer an 
unstated right to freedom of conscience from the First Amendment, 
the Free Exercise Clause could be read to require that laws 
accommodate individuals’ moral beliefs. However, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has led the law to the point where neither of these 
mechanisms requires significant accommodation of belief.  
1. No defined constitutional protection of conscience 
Notwithstanding the First Amendment’s textual silence 
regarding freedom of conscience, the Court could have inferred an 
unenumerated right to freedom of conscience from the religion 
clauses. The Supreme Court first examined this issue when deciding 
“whether conscientious objectors have a Constitutional right to 
refrain from participating in the military”47 in United States v. 
 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948), reprinted in JOSEPH MODESTE SWEENY ET 
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 
1981). For additional examples, see Marie-France Major, Conscientious Objection and 
International Law: A Human Right?, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 349 passim (1992) 
and Emily N. Marcus, Note, Conscientious Objection as an Emerging Human Right, 38 
VA. J. INT’L L. 507 passim (1998).  
 46. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also B.A. Robinson, 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Religious Aspects, RELIGIOUSTOLERANCE.ORG, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/amend_1.htm (last updated July 3, 2010) (listing 
language of previous drafts of the First Amendment, many explicitly protecting conscience). 
 47. Michael P. Seng, Conscientious Objection: Will the United States Accommodate Those 
Who Reject Violence as a Means of Dispute Resolution?, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 121, 126 
(1992). 
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Schwimmer.48 The Court held that the United States could withhold 
citizenship from a pacifist who was otherwise qualified for 
naturalization solely because, although she herself felt qualified to do 
so,49 the Court “found her unable . . . to take the prescribed oath of 
allegiance.”50 Specifically, when asked: “‘If necessary, are you willing 
to take up arms in defense of the country?’ She answered: ‘I would 
not take up arms personally.’”51 That the Court declined to find a 
right to conscientious objection is especially surprising when one 
considers the facts of this case: women have never been drafted by 
the United States, and at over fifty years old,52 even men her age 
were not eligible for the draft.53  Therefore, she could not have been 
drafted, regardless of her willingness to take up arms. 
In 1946, the Court in Girouard v. United States54 addressed a 
case with facts almost identical to those in Schwimmer, this time 
finding that conscientious objectors had a right to be naturalized 
under the Act.55 The majority’s reasoning for their decision discussed 
the importance of conscience as follows: 
The struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been an 
effort to accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of the 
individual. The victory for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill 
of Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is a moral 
power higher than the State. Throughout the ages men have suffered 
death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the 
authority of the State. Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First 
Amendment is the product of that struggle.56 
This recognition of conscience, that state law should accommodate 
it, and the incorporation of these principles within the First 
Amendment, gave “hope that the Court would hold that 
conscientious objection was protected by the Constitution.”57 
 
 48. 279 U.S. 644 (1929). 
 49. Id. at 647. 
 50. Id. at 646. 
 51. Id. at 647. 
 52. Id. at 653 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. at 648 (majority opinion). 
 54. 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
 55. Id. at 62, 70. 
 56. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 57. Seng, supra note 47, at 127. 
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However, the Court made it clear in Gillette v. United States58 that it 
would not recognize such a protection in the Constitution.59 
The accommodation that Congress had provided to 
conscientious objectors in the Selective Service and Training Act60 
limited its exemption to only those “who, by reason of religious 
training and belief, [are] conscientiously opposed to participation in 
war in any form.”61 Although the Court held in Gillette that the 
Selective Service Act did not violate the Establishment Clause,62 it 
also held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require Congress to 
exempt individuals who objected to the draft on religious grounds 
from participation in a particular war.63 Through this holding, the 
Court essentially refused to read a protection of conscience into the 
First Amendment.64 This resulted in what religious-freedom scholar 
Eugene Volokh has termed “the statutory exemption model,”65 
where exemptions are available for religious objectors “if and only if 
the statute provided for one.”66 
2. The expansion and later narrowing of the Free Exercise Clause  
Although the Court declined to read protection of conscience 
into the First Amendment, the text of the Free Exercise Clause itself 
could support a claim for exemption from laws that coerce 
individuals to engage in conduct that conflicts with their religious 
beliefs. In Sherbert v. Verner,67 the Supreme Court first interpreted 
the Free Exercise Clause to provide this sort of protection under 
what has been deemed the “constitutional exemption model.”68 
 
 58. 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
 59. Seng, supra note 47, at 127. 
 60. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 783, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 
Stat. 885, 889 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 451–473 (1988)). 
 61. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 62. Id. at 452–53. 
 63. Id. at 461–62. 
 64. See Seng, supra note 47, at 127. 
 65. Eugene Volokh, Some Background on Religious Exemption Law, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 12, 2010, 7:07 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/12/some-
background-on-religious-exemption-law-2/. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the First Amendment compelled 
accommodation for a Sabbatarian who was denied unemployment benefits because she refused 
to accept a job that would have required her to work on Saturday). 
 68. Volokh, supra note 65. 
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Under this model, “sincere religious objectors had a presumptive 
constitutional right to an exemption,” although this presumption 
could be overcome if the government could meet strict scrutiny by 
showing the law they seek to apply to the objector “is the least 
restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest.”69 By 
making religious objection a constitutional matter, this model 
substantially increased the accommodations that religious objectors 
could receive. 
Notwithstanding its constitutional basis, the constitutional 
exception model was drastically narrowed by subsequent cases. In 
Employment Division v. Smith,70 the Court held that the First 
Amendment did not require any accommodation from a law 
prohibiting the use of peyote for individuals who ingested peyote for 
legitimate and sincere religious purposes.71 The majority opinion 
supported this holding with extremely broad language, stating that 
“[t]he mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the 
relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen 
from the discharge of political responsibilities.”72 In doing this, the 
Court essentially “rejected the constitutional exemption regime” and 
“returned to the statutory exemption regime.”73 
The Court’s holdings in Smith and its progeny strongly suggest 
that, as far as federal law is concerned,74 “broad constitutional 
arguments appealing to freedom of religion or of conscience [are 
unlikely to] prevail before the courts in the immediate future.”75 As 
other scholars have noted, these cases make the likelihood of success 
of federal constitutional claims for accommodation of religion seem 
very doubtful, as plaintiffs are now required to show that the “anti-
discrimination rules from which they seek exemption are not 
 
 69. Id. However, Volokh also notes that although the Court describes the strict-scrutiny 
test in the same way it is described when applied in other contexts, in practice courts give the 
government much more leeway than usual when applying the test in the religious freedom 
context. See id. (describing the test as going from “strict in theory, fatal in fact” generally, to 
“strict in theory, feeble in fact” in the religious freedom context) (citations omitted). 
 70. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 71. Id. at 890. 
 72. Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–
95 (1940)). 
 73. Volokh, supra note 65. It should also be noted that the Court has not overruled the 
pre-Smith cases that required accommodations under “strict scrutiny” review. 
 74. State protections may still be available; see infra Part IV.A.2. 
 75. Seng, supra note 47, at 127–28. 
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‘neutral, generally applicable regulatory law[s]’” to survive Smith.76 
“Because protections for same-sex couples do not specifically target 
religious conduct or motives, the Free Exercise Clause offers no 
support for exemption claims.”77 
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AVENUES OF ACCOMMODATION 
Although the Court has not established a right to 
accommodation of conscience or required more than rational basis 
review for laws that infringe on religious exercise, other avenues of 
accommodation are available. This Part provides a brief overview of 
the remaining methods of accommodation used in the United States, 
and is followed by Part V, which describes the specific 
accommodations that have been extended. Post-Smith, 
accommodation is usually provided by the legislature,78 either 
through a specific state or federal statute or a state constitution. 
Methods of accommodation fall into two general categories: 1) 
legislative measures protecting free exercise generally and 2) ad hoc 
legislative measures granting accommodation in specific contexts. In 
each of these contexts, both federal and state legislatures have 
provided some degree of accommodation for conscientious 
objectors.  
 
 76. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 29, at 287 (alternation in original) (quoting Smith, 494 
U.S. at 880). Other scholars have reached the same conclusion regarding the application of 
Smith to First Amendment claims in the religious liberty context. For example, one scholar 
notes: 
As a matter of current First Amendment doctrine, there is much force to the claim 
that there is no legally important clash between religious liberty and equal 
recognition of same-sex marriage. The controlling case in this area is Employment 
Division v. Smith, in which the Supreme Court held that facially neutral, generally 
applicable laws burdening religion need no special legislative justification and, 
therefore, would not be subject to compelling (or other heightened) interest 
analysis. Laws that mandate the acceptance of the validity of same-sex marriage 
would be neutral laws of general applicability and, hence, would require no special 
justification to satisfy the federal constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion. 
Stern, supra note 42, at 310 (footnotes omitted). 
 77. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 29, at 287–88. 
 78. Volokh, supra note 65 (also admitting that this is an oversimplification). 
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A. Overview of Legislative and Constitutional Measures Protecting 
Free Exercise Generally 
1. Congressional legislation 
Since Smith, the treatment of claims for religious exemption has 
become fractured, with the correct standard depending on context. 
This began soon after the Smith decision when Congress passed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).79 This Act sought to 
restore the pre-Smith constitutional exemption regime.80 
However, four years after its passage, the Court in City of Boerne 
v. Flores81 struck RFRA as unconstitutional when applied against state 
law.82 Congress’s powers “are defined and limited,” and therefore 
the legislation it enacts must be supported by one of those 
enumerated powers.83 RFRA was passed under Section 5 of the 14th 
Amendment, which allows Congress to enforce the provisions of the 
Amendment.84 However, the Court held that “RFRA contradicts 
vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the 
federal balance”85 due to its “[s]weeping coverage” that “ensures its 
intrusion at every level of government.”86 This did not eliminate the 
Act entirely, as its scope was later amended to comply with City of 
Boerne.87 This revision seems to be constitutionally appropriate, as 
 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
 80. Eric D. Yordy, Fixing Free Exercise: A Compelling Need to Relieve the Current 
Burdens, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 191, 205–06 (2009) (“The legislative history of RFRA 
provides clear evidence of Congress’s intent to reverse the effect of the Smith decision.” (citing 
139 CONG. REC. E1243-03 to E1244-01 (daily ed. May 12, 1993) (statement of Rep. 
Franks); 139 CONG. REC. E1234-01 (daily ed. May 12, 1993) (statement of Rep. Cardin); 
139 CONG. REC. H2356-03 to H2357-01 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. 
Brooks); 139 CONG. REC. H2361-03 to H2362-01 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of 
Rep. Tucker); S. REP. 103-111, at 1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898; 
H.R. REP. NO. 103-88 (1993))). 
 81. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
 82. Id. at 535. 
 83. Id. at 516–17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84. Id. at 517. 
 85. Id. at 536. 
 86. Id. at 532. 
 87. Carl H. Esbeck, The Application of RFRA to Override Employment Non-
Discrimination Clauses Embedded in Federal Social Service Programs, 9 ENGAGE 140, 143 n.11 
(June 2008), available at http://library.findlaw.com/2008/ Jun/1/247208.html. 
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the Court has applied the amended version of the Act to matters of 
federal law.88 
Congress also responded to City of Boerne by passing the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),89 
which protects both “land use as religious exercise”90 and the 
“religious exercise of institutionalized persons.”91 As RLUIPA’s 
scope is much narrower and is grounded in Congress’s power under 
the Commerce and Spending Clauses,92 it is a valid exercise of 
Congressional power.93 
2. State RFRAs and constitutional provisions 
Post-City of Boerne, the treatment of state law claims for religious 
exemption varies greatly from state to state. In response to the 
Court’s invalidation of RFRA with respect to state law, many states 
have passed their own RFRAs or constitutional amendments 
requiring a return to the strict scrutiny standard for religious-
exemption cases.94 In other states, the highest court has interpreted 
the religious freedom protections in the state constitution as 
requiring either strict scrutiny or weak intermediate scrutiny.95 
Remaining states have either refused to apply strict scrutiny or have 
not yet determined which standard of review applies.96  
 
 88. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 
(2006) (applying RFRA to a federal law). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006). 
 90. Id. § 2000cc. 
 91. Id. § 2000cc-1. 
 92. Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism: 
Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local Government, 40 
URB. LAW. 195, 212 (2008). 
 93. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1243 (11th Cir. 2004); 
see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719–20 (2005). 
 94. See Volokh, supra note 65; see also Eugene Volokh, Religious Exemption Law Map of 
the United States, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 9, 2010, 5:36 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/ 
07/09/religious-exemption-law-map-of-the-united-states/ [hereinafter Volokh, Religious 
Exemption Map]. Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Virginia have each passed a state RFRA, while Alabama enacted its state RFRA via 
constitutional amendment. Id. 
 95. See Volokh, Religious Exemption Map, supra note 94. Courts in Alaska, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Washington, 
and Wisconsin interpret their constitutions to require strict scrutiny, while the constitutional 
provisions in New York have been interpreted to require intermediate scrutiny. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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B. Overview of Ad Hoc Legislative Accommodations in Specific 
Contexts 
In addition to the general protections of free exercise that have 
been enacted, both federal and state legislatures have enacted 
exemptions and accommodations on a context-by-context basis for 
individuals who face a test of conscience. Structural concerns dealing 
with enumerated powers and federalism limit the scope of 
accommodations for both federal and state legislative enactments. 
Congressional accommodation has been an avenue for 
accommodation both pre- and post-Smith. However, as City of 
Boerne made clear, when Congress accommodates conscientious 
objectors, it must be acting within the scope of its enumerated 
powers.97 Traditional powers that Congress uses to legislate include 
its commerce power,98 spending power,99 taxing power,100 and its 
power to enforce the civil rights protections granted by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.101 
State legislatures can also accommodate conscientious objectors 
on a context-by-context basis. Unlike Congress, States are not 
bound by certain enumerated powers102 and are therefore they are 
free to legislate on a broader scope. However, the Supremacy Clause 
of the Constitution103 prevents states from legislating in a way that 
“interferes with and frustrates” a federal interest or statute.104 
Another significant limitation on the ability of ad hoc legislative 
accommodations to protect conscience is that they can be trumped 
by a state’s own constitutional provisions.105 This was demonstrated 
in Valley Hospital Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-SU Coalition for Choice,106 where 
the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a hospital’s policy to only 
provide abortions when special criteria were met was in violation of 
the state constitution.107 Although the state’s conscience clause 
 
 97. See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 99. Id. cl. 1. 
 100. Id. 
 101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 102. See id. amend. X. 
 103. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 104. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988). 
 105. Wilson, supra note 10, at 91. 
 106. 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). 
 107. Id. at 965, 973. 
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explicitly provided an exemption for the hospital’s conduct, this was 
“at most a statutory right” that the legislature could not permissibly 
balance against constitutional rights.108 Ultimately, the Court held 
that the hospital could not prevent doctors who were qualified and 
willing to perform abortions from doing so in its facilities.109 
Notwithstanding these limitations, state legislative protections 
are ultimately the most likely means of effectively protecting civil 
servants who object to same-sex marriage.110 Others have presented a 
compelling case for states to accommodate these civil servants in the 
same way that the states have recently accommodated religious 
beliefs in a variety of other contexts.111  
V. REVIEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOMMODATIONS MADE IN OTHER 
CONTEXTS 
A. General Protections of Free Exercise 
 Both federal and state legislatures have accommodated 
individuals in their beliefs in a variety of contexts. These methods of 
accommodation provide a helpful model for accommodating civil 
servants who object to same-sex marriage. 
1. Accommodation mandated by the First Amendment 
Even prior to Employment Division v. Smith,112 the Court’s 
protection of conscience under the First Amendment was limited.113 
However, the Court did require accommodation under the Free 
Exercise Clause in a few limited situations. For example, in Sherbert 
v. Verner,114 the Court held that the First Amendment compelled 
accommodation for a Sabbatarian woman who was denied 
unemployment benefits because she refused to take a job that 
required her to work on Saturday.115 
 
 108. Id. at 972. 
 109. Id.  
 110. See supra Part VI.A. 
 111. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 112. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 113. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 114. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 115. Id. at 409–10. 
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In another case, a woman challenged a requirement that an 
individual’s picture must appear on their driver’s license, as this 
conflicted with her religious beliefs.116 Here, the Eighth Circuit held 
that the requirement was an impermissible burden to the woman’s 
religious freedom, the state interest was insufficient to justify the 
burden, and accommodation of her beliefs was required.117 This 
holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court.118 
Following the Court’s holding in Smith, it seems doubtful that 
the Court would find accommodation required by the First 
Amendment.119 However, the judicial branch is still a primary 
(although recently passive) actor in the granting of accommodation. 
Although the First Amendment has largely been removed as a basis 
for accommodation, courts still do interpret and enforce state and 
federal legislation requiring accommodation. 
2. Federal protections of free exercise 
RFRA, although struck as unconstitutional with respect to the 
states, is still controlling for questions of federal law.120 The stated 
purposes of this statute are: 
1. to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free 
exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and 
2. to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise 
is substantially burdened by government. 121 
This statute restores the strict-scrutiny tests previously used and 
therefore provides much more protection than the Smith standard, 
although only in limited circumstances where the Act applies.122 
 
 116. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1122–23 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 117. Id. at 1123–28. 
 118. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (per curiam). 
 119. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 120. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. RFRA was also amended to apply 
only to the federal government and the District of Colombia. Esbeck, supra note 87, at 140 
(citing Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (1988) 
(amended 2001)). 
 121. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2006). 
 122. It should be noted that strict scrutiny in the religious exemption context, as 
implemented by Sherbert and Yoder, has traditionally been much less strict than in other 
contexts. See supra note 69. 
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3. State RFRAs and constitutional provisions 
In states that have enacted them, state RFRAs can require state 
laws to grant the same accommodation originally provided by the 
federal RFRA. In other states, the courts have provided these same 
accommodations by interpreting the state constitutional provisions 
protecting religious freedom to require strict scrutiny.123 While these 
standards usually apply quite broadly, even providing “‘no 
exceptions for the government acting in special capacities,’ for 
instance, as an employer,”124 they “are not frequently invoked” and 
“the outer limits of the state’s duty to accommodate religious beliefs 
are not well-defined.”125 
One case where a state strict scrutiny requirement did provide an 
accommodation of religious belief was Minnesota v. Hershberger.126 
In this case, “members of the Old Order Amish (‘the Amish’) 
religion moved in the district court for dismissal of traffic citations 
each had received for noncompliance” with a statute requiring 
“slow-moving vehicles to display a fluorescent orange-red triangular 
sign emblem when being operated on the state’s public highways.”127 
When the Minnesota Supreme Court first heard this case 
(Hershberger I),128 it held that this requirement was in violation of 
the individuals’ First Amendment right to free exercise and approved 
an alternative means of safety lighting proposed by the Amish.129 The 
State appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, and “[w]hile 
that petition was pending, the Court handed down Smith. It then 
remanded the Amish case to the State Supreme Court in light of 
Smith.”130 On rehearing, the court again held the regulation 
impermissible, this time as a violation of the Minnesota 
constitution’s religious freedom provision.131 
 
 123. See Volokh, supra note 65. 
 124. Wilson, supra note 4, at 347 (citing Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of 
Religious Exemptions—A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 635 
(1999)). 
 125. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 126. 464 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) [hereinafter Hershberger II]. 
 127. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989) [hereinafter 
Hershberger I]. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 289. 
 130. Ronald B. Flowers, Government Accommodation of Religious-Based Conscientious 
Objection, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 695, 726 (1993). 
 131. Hershberger II, 464 N.W.2d at 399. 
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B. Ad Hoc Accommodation by Congress 
1. Military service 
As previously discussed, Congress allows some exemptions for 
conscientious objectors to military service.132 While the Supreme 
Court held that these accommodations were not prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause, they also are not mandated by the Free 
Exercise Clause.133 While this ruling means that most 
accommodation of religious freedom must come from the legislative 
branch rather than being judicially administered,134 the Court has 
clarified the scope of accommodation granted in statutes that 
Congress already enacted. 
The Court clarified and expanded the scope of military 
accommodation allowed under the Selective Training and Service 
Act.135 The Court first did this in United States v. Seeger,136 where it 
ruled that a belief in God was not required to receive an exemption 
under the Act.137 In this case, the Court held that an exemption was 
appropriate for an objection based on a sincere “belief in and 
devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes.”138 
The scope of accommodation for objectors to military service 
was extended further still in Welsh v. United States.139 Here, the 
Court interpreted Congress’s language to allow accommodation for 
conscientious objectors whose “opposition to war stem[s] from 
[their] moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and 
wrong” as long as “these beliefs be held with the strength of 
traditional religious convictions.”140 The Court stated: 
 
 132. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 133. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text. 
 134. Volokh, supra note 65. Although the Court has, on rare instances, required 
accommodation when none was contemplated by Congress, the chances of this happening 
seem small post-Smith. See, e.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) (holding that 
an individual who objected to serving in a combatant role, but not to military service in 
general, could be granted U.S. citizenship).  
 135. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 783, ch. 625, § 5(g), 54 
Stat. 885, 889 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–473 (1988)). 
 136. 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965). 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 166. 
 139. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 140. Id. at 340. 
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If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely 
ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose 
upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any 
war at any time . . . such an individual is as much entitled to a 
“religious” conscientious objector exemption . . . as is someone 
who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional 
religious convictions.141 
This holding expands the scope of conscientious objection so as to 
cover much more than what would be traditionally considered 
“religious” belief. By granting exemptions based on the belief’s 
binding effect on the individual rather than the source of those 
beliefs, the Court’s holding accommodates even those plaintiffs who 
do not consider themselves religious.142 
However, as was discussed previously, the Court subsequently 
limited this holding by accommodating only those who are 
“conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.”143 
While this holding was consistent with Congress’s language in the 
Selective Service and Training Act,144 it was significant that the Court 
held the Free Exercise Clause did not require any exemptions 
beyond those explicitly provided in the Act.145 
2. Payment of taxes 
Congress has also given partial accommodation of beliefs to 
individuals who have various conscientious objections to the 
payment and receipt of taxes. Individuals object to the payment of 
taxes for a variety of reasons, and Congress has accommodated some 
of the conscientious objections. One area where Congress has 
accommodated religious beliefs is in the payment and receipt of 
Social Security taxes by self-employed individuals.146 Participation in 
this system goes against fundamental beliefs of some individuals, 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Flowers, supra note 130, at 704. 
 143. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 441 (1971) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1964)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 144. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 783, ch. 625, § 5(g), 54 
Stat. 885, 889 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–73 (1988)). 
 145. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 461–62. 
 146. Flowers, supra note 130, at 711–12. 
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such as the Amish, who promote self-sufficiency and the 
responsibility to take care of one’s own family.147 
Although Congress did accommodate these individuals,148 the 
Court in United States v. Lee149 held that this accommodation could 
not be extended beyond the self-employed, even if both the 
employer and the employee shared the same legitimate conscientious 
objection to participation in this program.150 The Court reasoned 
that “[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were 
allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent 
in a manner that violates their religious belief.”151 Due to Congress’s 
narrow crafting of the statute, this exemption is also only available to 
active participants of “a sect that teaches both . . . self-sufficiency and 
rejection of government social insurance benefits.”152 This is a stark 
departure from the belief-focused, organization-neutral 
accommodation granted in the military context.153 
One context where Congress has not accommodated individuals 
with a conscientious objection is the payment of taxes supporting the 
military. “Because government revenue finances the equipment and 
prosecution of war, some believe that by withholding tax payments, 
a protest against war can be made and, at the same time, one’s 
conscience can be satisfied by nonparticipation.”154 There are various 
ways that objectors engage in war tax protest,155 none of which have 
received Congressional accommodation.156 Despite the parallels to 
military conscientious objection, the Court has not required any 
exemption for war tax protestors,157 which is consistent with the 
overall treatment of requests for accommodation under the First 
Amendment.158 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1988). 
 149. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 150. Flowers, supra note 130, at 712. 
 151. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260 (citations omitted). 
 152. Flowers, supra note 130, at 712–13 (citing Hughes v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 683 
(1983); Borntrager v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1242, 1243 (1990)). 
 153. See supra Part V.B.1. 
 154. Flowers, supra note 130, at 714. 
 155. See id. (describing methods used by war tax protestors). 
 156. Id. at 714–16. 
 157. See id.  
 158. See supra Parts III.B.2, V.B.1–2. 
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3. Health Care 
Congressional accommodation of conscientious objectors who 
provide medical care is arguably the most comprehensive protection 
Congress provides to conscientious objectors. The Church 
Amendment,159 enacted in 1973160 in response to Roe v. Wade,161 
states that the receipt of public funds 
by any individual or entity does not authorize any court or any 
public official or other public authority to require . . . such 
individual to perform or assist in the performance of any 
sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance 
in the performance of such procedure or abortion would be 
contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.162 
The amendment also prohibits health care providers who receive 
public funds from discriminating against an employee “because he 
refused to perform or assist in the performance of such a procedure 
or abortion . . . because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions 
respecting sterilization procedures or abortions.”163 
This congressional accommodation is particularly significant 
when its impact is considered. The amendment requires 
accommodation even in the face of “the very strong constitutional 
rights to abortion and contraception established in Roe v. Wade.”164 
Furthermore, before its enactment, some family planning 
organizations were fairly successful in compelling health care 
providers to make controversial services available to their patients.165 
This illustrates both the power accommodation can have and the 
types of moral conflicts that can easily occur if accommodation is not 
provided. 
 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006). 
 160. The Church Amendment was included as part of the Health Programs Extension 
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 91. 
 161. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 162. § 300a-7(b)(1). 
 163. § 300a-7(c). 
 164.  Wilson, supra note 10, at 79. 
 165. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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C. Ad Hoc Accommodation by State Legislatures 
1. Health Care 
In response to Roe v. Wade and to further the purpose of the 
Church Amendment, states began enacting legislation 
accommodating health care professionals with a conscientious 
objection to performing certain procedures.166 By the end of 1978, 
virtually all states had enacted similar legislation, providing some 
degree of exemption for conscientious objectors.167 However, the 
degree of protection and ease of claiming an exemption varies 
drastically from state to state.168 For example, in order to claim an 
exemption, some states require only that a conscientious objector 
provide notice to patients beforehand.169 Others focus more on the 
patient, allowing conscientious exemption as long as it would not 
“pose a ‘road block’ to the patient’s ability to access the desired 
service from another provider.”170 Other states impose a referral 
requirement “requir[ing] the doctor or institution to facilitate the 
patient’s ability to get the service from another provider.”171 Finally, 
some states impose more onerous terms, “permit[ting] an objection 
only if the objector ‘shows proof’ or states the reasons for objecting 
in writing.”172 
After the passage of the Church Amendment and subsequent 
state legislation, the issue laid dormant for a number of years.173 
However, nearly twenty years later the growth of managed health 
care providers complicated the issue, leading some states to enact 
further legislation.174 For example, in 1997, Illinois, North Dakota, 
and Texas enacted laws that expanded the accommodations 
traditionally granted in two important ways.175 “First, these newer 
 
 166. Rachel Benson Gold, Conscience Makes a Comeback in the Age of Managed Care, 1 
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 1 (Feb. 1998); see also JODY FEDER, THE HISTORY AND 
EFFECT OF ABORTION CONSCIENCE CLAUSE LAWS 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS2142801142005.pdf.  
 167. See Gold, supra note 166. 
 168. Wilson, supra note 10, at 90. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Gold, supra note 166, at 1. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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laws go beyond abortion and sterilization . . . to apply to any health 
service about which an ethical, religious or moral objection is 
raised.”176 For example, the statute might be invoked to 
accommodate a reproductive endocrinologist with a conscientious 
objection to providing in vitro fertilization to a lesbian couple. 
The second expansion introduced by these laws is that they 
“explicitly take into account changes in the health care marketplace 
by greatly expanding the category of entities allowed to claim a 
conscientious objection. These now include not only health care 
providers . . . but also corporate payers, such as health plans.”177 This 
essentially “invest[s] a wide range of entities with the right to claim a 
corporate ‘conscience’ and opt out of paying for any health care 
service at will.”178 These protections have not been adopted as 
uniformly as the post-Roe v. Wade accommodations, leaving many 
organizations and health care professionals with a moral dilemma.179 
2. Prescription drugs 
The provision and coverage of prescription medication is one 
context where the expansion of accommodation described above180 is 
required to protect the religious beliefs of both the pharmacists who 
dispense prescription drugs and corporations that may pay for them 
as part of their health care plans. These concerns are raised primarily 
with respect to prescription contraceptives, whose usage is 
considered a sin by the Roman Catholic Church181 and which some 
pharmacists object to dispensing, considering it tantamount to 
participating in an abortion.182 
a. Employers’ healthcare coverage. In states that have not enacted 
legislation allowing employers to claim a conscientious objection, 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See infra Part V.C.2. 
 180. Referring to the expansion of accommodation to 1) cover health care-related 
conscientious objections beyond abortion and sterilization and 2) allow corporate payers to 
claim a conscientious objection. 
 181. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 75 (Cal. 
2004). 
 182. Jennifer E. Spreng, Conscientious Objectors Behind the Counter: Statutory Defense to 
Tort Liability for Failure to Dispense Contraceptives, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
337, 337–38 (2008). 
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religiously affiliated employers may be forced to pay for services or 
medication that they oppose. In December 2000, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission found that an employer who 
had excluded prescription contraception from its health care plan 
“engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”183 Shortly after this finding, a 
federal district court in Washington held that engaging in this 
practice constituted sex discrimination under Title VII.184 This trend 
suggests that more and more employers will be required to pay for 
prescription contraceptives, even if in direct contradiction to their 
religious beliefs. 
Even objecting employers in states that have enacted exemptions 
allowing organizations to claim a conscientious objection have been 
forced to provide prescription contraceptives. In Catholic Charities of 
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court,185 Catholic Charities sought an 
injunction exempting them from the duty of providing prescription 
contraceptives in its health care plan as required by the Women’s 
Contraception Equity Act (WCEA).186 The WCEA, enacted in 1999, 
included explicit accommodations for religious employers that object 
to providing plans that cover contraceptives.187 However, the 
California Supreme Court ruled that although Catholic Charities 
“considers itself obliged to follow the Roman Catholic Church’s 
religious teachings” and therefore believed that it would be 
facilitating sin by offering insurance for prescription contraceptives, it 
“d[id] not qualify as a religious employer under the WCEA” and 
could not be exempted under the statute.188 These examples clearly 
demonstrate that even in states that have enacted legislation 
accommodating religion, seeking to only accommodate a narrow 
class of individuals may leave many unprotected. 
b. Pharmacists. Like employers who provide insurance coverage, 
pharmacists with a conscientious objection to providing certain 
 
 183. EEOC, DECISION ON COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTION (Dec. 14, 2000), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html. 
 184. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1277 (W.D. Wash. 2001) 
(“[T]he exclusion of prescription contraceptives creates a gaping hole in the coverage offered 
to female employees, leaving a fundamental and immediate health care need uncovered.”). 
 185. 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004). 
 186. Id. at 73. 
 187. Id. at 74, 76. 
 188. Id. at 75–76. 
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medications have been accommodated in some states, while in other 
states they have not been afforded any protection. Many pharmacists’ 
trial of conscience began with the advent of RU-486, which 
“induces abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy without surgical 
intervention,” and “Plan B” emergency contraception, both of 
which are seen by some pharmacists as tantamount to abortion.189 
With the advent of these new medications, many pharmacists find 
themselves faced with a moral dilemma that they likely did not 
anticipate when they entered their professions. 
The response to this moral dilemma has varied greatly from state 
to state. Some states have enacted legislation accommodating 
pharmacists with a conscientious objection to distributing these 
medications190 while others have existing laws “that arguably relieve 
pharmacists from employment consequences, professional ethics 
violations, criminal liability, and civil liability for refusing to 
dispense.”191 The broadened conscience clause legislation recently 
enacted in some states may also provide protection for pharmacists, 
although that would depend greatly on both the language of the 
statute and how courts interpreted that language.192 
This accommodation has not gone unnoticed by “[p]ro-choice 
activist groups” who have pushed back against legislation 
accommodating pharmacists.193 Some states and pharmacy boards 
have shown sympathy for these arguments and have passed “must-
 
 189. Spreng, supra note 182, at 337–38. 
 190. Id. at 338 n.13 (citation omitted) (citing exemptions in Arkansas, Georgia, 
Mississippi, and South Dakota); accord Steve Ertelt, Washington State Capitulates, Sees Pro-Life 
Pharmacists’ Conscience Rights, LIFENEWS.COM (July 9, 2010), http://www.lifenews.com/ 
2010/07/09/state-5241/ (same).  
 191. Spreng, supra note 182, at 339 (footnotes omitted) (citing laws in California, 
Georgia, Illinois, Florida, and Maine that may each provide some protection for pharmacists’ 
beliefs). 
 192. See supra Part V.C.1; see also Wilson, supra note 10, at 79 (stating that state 
conscience clauses increasingly allow individuals to refuse to participate in “the dispensing of 
emergency contraceptives”); SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING 
CONFLICTS 299 app. (Douglas Laycock et al. eds. 2008) (appendix listing state 
accommodations of conscience in the health care context); Spreng, supra note 182, at 339 
nn.14–18 (listing existing accommodations that may apply to pharmacists); id. at 374 (stating 
that, although “[a]pproximately fifteen states have conscience legislation that may protect 
religious pharmacists from legal consequences if they refuse to dispense contraceptives[,] . . . 
[t]he reality is far more obscure”). 
 193. Spreng, supra note 182, at 340. 
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dispense” laws that “require pharmacists to dispense contraception 
regardless of conscience.”194 
The Washington state pharmacy board approved such rules in 
2007 “making pharmacists dispense all drugs, including those that 
would violate their moral or religious views.”195 Ralph’s Thriftway, a 
pharmacy located in the state, brought suit in federal court 
challenging this regulation, seeking “the right to refuse to stock or 
dispense Plan B  . . . based on [pharmacists’] conscientious 
objection” as the law forces them into “choosing between their 
livelihoods and their deeply held religious and moral beliefs.”196 
Before trial began, “attorneys for the State of Washington told a 
federal judge that it would create new rules for pharmacists with 
conscientious objections to dispensing the morning after pill,” at 
which point Plaintiffs agreed to postpone the trial until after the 
rulemaking process concluded.197 The State likely did this in light of 
the expected outcome of trial, as the judge had issued a preliminary 
injunction against the new rules, allowing pharmacists to refuse to fill 
a prescription if they refer customers to a pharmacy where they can 
get their order filled.198 
Although the probable outcome of that case seemed like it 
would favor accommodation, suits challenging “must-dispense” laws 
or regulations in other states may not be as successful, especially in 
light of the Smith decision.199 Furthermore, even in states that do 
not have “must-dispense” laws, “[m]any pharmacies have terminated 
refusing pharmacists” rather than allow another pharmacist to fill 
those prescriptions.200 The only real way to ensure that objecting 
pharmacists are accommodated is through state legislation allowing 
them to refuse to stock certain medications. 
 
 194. Id. States that have enacted this legislation include California, New Jersey, Illinois, 
and Washington. See Ertelt, supra note 190. 
 195. Ertelt, supra note 190. 
 196. Id. (citation omitted). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. The judge also stated: “On the issue of free exercise of religion alone, the 
evidence before the court convinces it that the plaintiffs . . . have demonstrated both a 
likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury.” Id. (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). 
 199. See also Spreng, supra note 182, at 341 & n.28 (“Court challenges to ‘must-fill’ 
statutes and rules have produced mixed results.”); Id. at 365–71 (explaining why free exercise 
claims for accommodation are unlikely to succeed). 
 200. Id. at 341 & n.30 (citing cases where pharmacists were fired or not hired due to 
their refusal to distribute contraceptives). 
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Surveys indicate that legislation accommodating conscientious 
objectors is supported by most Americans, with “[s]ixty-five percent 
support[ing] pharmacist[s’] right to decline to fill or counsel for 
prescription drugs which violate their moral or religious views.”201 
Professional pharmacist associations have also issued “endorsements 
of conscience protections for pharmacists that would not impede 
customer access to prescription drugs.”202 Many of the concerns that 
do exist relate to the customer’s ability to purchase the prescription 
drugs.203 However, these concerns have been and can continue to be 
addressed by imposing referral requirements on conscientious 
objectors, as many states have already done in the health care 
context.204 
In spite of the popular approval and the ease with which states 
can address access concerns, only a small number of states have 
enacted legislation accommodating pharmacists. The reason more 
states have not enacted accommodating legislation may be due to 
the “relatively small number of [individuals] who find themselves 
morally conflicted.”205 However, the fact that some states have 
accommodated pharmacists who object to providing certain 
medications may help other states follow suit. 
3. Adoption Agencies 
A group of conscientious objectors that have not received any 
accommodation for their religious beliefs are the adoption agencies 
that object to providing adoptions to same-sex couples. A number of 
recent cases have found that the Free Exercise Clause does not 
protect agencies from the requirement to provide adoptions that go 
against their religious beliefs.206 This lack of accommodation has led 
 
 201. Ertelt, supra note 190. 
      202.   Spreng, supra note 182, at 339. 
 203. See, e.g., Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection — May 
Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?, 351 N. ENG. J. MED. 
2008, 2009–10 (2004), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/ 
NEJMsb042263; Bernard M. Dickens, Legal Protection and Limits of Conscientious Objection: 
When Conscientious Objection Is Unethical, 28 MED. & L. 337, 341 (2009). 
 204. See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text. 
 205. Bleich, supra note 7, at 247. 
 206. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Adoption 
of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); 
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (holding that a same-sex couple may jointly 
adopt the two subject children). 
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some agencies to close their doors rather than provide these 
adoptions.207 
Although these closures have not resulted in any 
accommodation, they have had an effect on the overall public 
perception of same-sex marriage. Specifically, the failure to 
accommodate adoption agencies may rally the public against same-
sex marriage in other contexts. This was seen in California, where 
one of the Proposition 8 commercials stated: “If Proposition 8 fails, 
religious adoption agencies may be forced to place children in same 
sex marriages or discontinue providing adoption services altogether. 
That’s what happened to Catholic Charities in Massachusetts.”208 
This suggests that accommodation of individuals with a religious 
objection to same-sex marriage in states where it has been adopted 
may facilitate its adoption in other states. 
VI. LESSONS FROM ACCOMMODATION IN OTHER CONTEXTS 
This review of the mechanisms by which conscience is protected 
and the key areas where it has and has not received protection can 
assist those considering how states can best accommodate 
conscientious objectors. This Comment will now apply the 
information in this review to the accommodation of civil servants 
who object to performing or facilitating same-sex marriages. 
A. The Most Likely Avenue for Accommodation of Civil Servants 
 The Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment post-Smith 
will likely provide no protection for the civil servants’ beliefs. 
Furthermore, courts consistently have found no First Amendment 
protection for conscientious objectors. 
Congress’s legislation providing general protections of religious 
freedom will also be of little value for civil servants who object to 
facilitating same-sex marriages. As a matter of state law, the provision 
of marriage to same-sex couples would fall outside the scope of 
protection of the federal RFRA. Furthermore, RLUIPA would not 
 
 207. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 10, at  209 (discussing how Catholic Charities in 
Massachusetts stopped providing adoptions when faced with the choice of providing adoptions 
to same-sex couples or losing its license); Same-sex ‘Marriage’ Law Forces D.C. Catholic 
Charities to Close Adoption Program, CATHOLICNEWSAGENCY.COM (Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://tinyurl.com/yl5r69x. 
 208. PreservingMarriage, YES on Proposition 8 (Prop 8) Your Rights, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-jc4ujp9Ok. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:23 PM 
1625 Moral Mandate or Personal Preference? 
 1655 
be of any assistance, as it provides protections for prisoners and with 
respect to property dispute issues. Targeted congressional legislation 
enacted on an ad hoc basis would also have a very small chance of 
providing protection, as this area of law would likely be considered 
outside of Congress’s power to legislate. 
As this is a state law issue, state RFRAs and constitutional 
provisions may provide some objecting civil servants with 
protections. No state mandating strict scrutiny has addressed the 
issue of accommodation for religious objectors to same-sex 
marriage.209 However, there is a strong argument that a case for a 
religious accommodation, even for civil servants, would be successful 
under the strict scrutiny standard.210 The success of such a case 
would likely hinge on which law was challenged and what the court 
perceived the government interest to be.211 The determination of this 
issue would need to be resolved on a state-by-state basis, and would 
depend entirely on the analysis of the highest court of each state 
hearing the issue. This makes protection both unpredictable and 
difficult to obtain, as it would require that a civil servant lose her job 
and then litigate a difficult case with no guarantee of 
accommodation, which in itself is quite burdensome and financially 
prohibitive. 
 
 209. Cf. Wilson, supra note 4, at 346–47 (failing to mention any cases when discussing 
this issue and specifically noting that as “state RFRAs ‘are not frequently invoked,’ . . . the 
outer limits of the state’s duty to religious beliefs are not well-defined”) (citation omitted). 
None of the states that allow same-sex marriage have constitutions that have been interpreted 
to require strict scrutiny. See Volokh, Religious Exemption Map, supra note 94. Only 
Connecticut, which enacted religious exemptions—although not for civil servants—when 
legalizing same-sex marriage, had previously enacted a state RFRA. Wilson, supra note 4, at 
347. 
 210. Wilson, supra note 4, at 346–47. 
 211. There would likely be a substantial burden in a civil-servant accommodation case, as 
the government is “compelling someone to do something that violates his religious beliefs.” 
Volokh, supra note 65. Therefore, for a statute to survive, the government would have to 
demonstrate that it is using the least restrictive means possible of reaching a compelling 
governmental interest. If same-sex marriage is taken as a given and a state’s equal provision of 
services statute is challenged, it may very well pass strict scrutiny. 
  However, if a court were to apply strict scrutiny directly to the state law allowing 
same-sex marriage, the result may be different. These cases would likely depend on what the 
court perceived the governmental interest to be. If the court saw the interest being the 
provision of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples, laws allowing same-sex marriage may 
not pass strict scrutiny, as less restrictive means, such as civil unions, would accomplish this 
same objective. This means that these provisions may invalidate a law allowing same-sex 
marriage, but may not invalidate a law compelling equal protection or provision of services. 
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Due to the weaknesses in the protection offered by state RFRAs 
and constitutional provisions, and the probable inefficacy of federal 
constitutional and congressional protections, the best and most likely 
avenue of accommodation is through ad hoc exemptions enacted by 
the legislature of each state. 
B. Guidance Regarding How State Legislatures Can Best 
Accommodate Civil Servants 
With effective accommodation likely being left to state 
legislatures, these issues will ultimately be decided on a state-by-state 
basis. However, this review shows that protections for beliefs held by 
a small subset of the population are infrequently enacted and 
narrowly crafted, likely for the reasons discussed in Part II.C. For the 
states that do enact accommodating legislation, the first states that 
enact legislation will likely serve as a guide for states that follow. 
Therefore, states enacting accommodations should write legislation 
carefully to ensure the most effective protection for conscientious 
objectors.  
One lesson that can be gleaned from the above review for states 
seeking to accommodate conscientious objectors is that statutes that 
are crafted too narrowly or ambiguously will leave many individuals 
without protection. As was discussed, courts significantly limited the 
individuals to which the statute applied based on the language in the 
statute when reviewing accommodation relating to military service, 
payment of taxes, and the provision of contraceptives as part of 
employer health care coverage. The opinions in these cases did not 
suggest that these individuals’ beliefs were any less sincere or 
important; they simply fell outside the court’s narrow interpretation 
of what the legislature explicitly protected. 
The review of accommodation provided to health care providers 
by states offers further guidance regarding how statutes should be 
crafted. Accommodation in that context clearly shows that state 
constitutional provisions will trump statutes providing 
accommodation for conscientious objectors. This further suggests 
that states providing accommodation for their civil servants will have 
to carefully craft the statute so as to not run afoul of constitutional 
protections. 
Finally, accommodations granted in both the health care and 
prescription drug contexts suggest that legislation that 
accommodates civil servants while still providing equal service to all 
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members of the public is the least objectionable, as both traditional 
and same-sex couples will be afforded equal treatment. In the 
prescription drug and healthcare contexts, this was accomplished 
through employee referrals. Scholars have suggested a similar 
“information forcing” system for same-sex marriage, with “rules that 
require refusing parties to direct couples to others who will perform 
the service.”212 This system would “allow protection for matters of 
conscience without sacrificing access or humiliating same-sex 
couples.”213 These types of accommodation would also be likely to 
pass constitutional review, as all comers would receive the same 
treatment.214 Moreover, these types of accommodations will likely 
not have a large impact, as scholars hypothesize that few civil 
servants will claim this exemption.215 
C. Current Methods of Accommodation Are Ineffective 
On a much broader level, methods of accommodation that are 
currently available may be ineffective because beliefs held by a small 
subset of the population are infrequently protected, and even when 
minority beliefs are protected, the legislation is often narrowly 
crafted. Furthermore, as is discussed above, courts have consistently 
interpreted protections narrowly, not because the beliefs of 
individuals were any less significant, but because the language in the 
statute was ambiguous. These failings of the current system suggest 
that further scholarship should be conducted to explore either 1) 
other possible avenues of accommodation or 2) ways that current 
avenues can be modified to provide greater protection to 
conscientious objectors. 
 
 212. Wilson, supra note 10, at 98. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 97–100. 
 215. For example, as Stern has observed: 
[R]eligious believers who oppose same-sex marriages . . . should not be required to 
act directly in opposition to their religious beliefs, that is, in ways that appear to 
confer their personal blessing on such marriages. While such exemptions are 
necessary, there are probably far fewer people around who would invoke such 
exemptions than is generally thought.  
Stern, supra note 42, at 308 (although discussing accommodation only for private 
providers of commercial services). But see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 29, at 295 
(“[B]ecause the exemption is potentially much broader in scope than other religious 
exemptions, and lacks the practical constraints present in the employment context . . . 
proponents [may not be] correct in predicting that the exemption would have little effect 
on same-sex couples.”). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
An examination of the current methods of accommodation offers 
significant guidance for states considering accommodating civil 
servants opposed to same-sex marriage. This accommodation will 
most likely come from state legislatures on an ad hoc basis, and the 
best method of accommodation would allow civil servants to abstain 
from facilitating same-sex marriage while still providing the same 
services to same-sex couples, likely through a referral service. The 
accommodations currently provided in the United States do not 
effectively accommodate religious belief and new avenues of 
accommodation should be explored. 
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